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Auction Mechanisms in Cloud/Fog Computing Resource Allocation for Public Blockchain Networks

机译:公共区块链网络的云/雾计算资源分配中的拍卖机制

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As an emerging decentralized secure data management platform, blockchain has gained much popularity recently. To maintain a canonical state of blockchain data record, proof-of-work based consensus protocols provide the nodes, referred to as miners, in the network with incentives for confirming new block of transactions through a process of "block mining" by solving a cryptographic puzzle. Under the circumstance of limited local computing resources, e.g., mobile devices, it is natural for rational miners, i.e., consensus nodes, to offload computational tasks for proof of work to the cloud/fog computing servers. Therefore, we focus on the trading between the cloud/fog computing service provider and miners, and propose an auction-based market model for efficient computing resource allocation. In particular, we consider a proof-of-work based blockchain network, which is constrained by the computing resource and deployed as an infrastructure for decentralized data management applications. Due to the competition among miners in the blockchain network, the allocative externalities are particularly taken into account when designing the auction mechanisms. Specifically, we consider two bidding schemes: the constant-demand scheme where each miner bids for a fixed quantity of resources, and the multi-demand scheme where the miners can submit their preferable demands and bids. For the constant-demand bidding scheme, we propose an auction mechanism that achieves optimal social welfare. In the multi-demand bidding scheme, the social welfare maximization problem is NP-hard. Therefore, we design an approximate algorithm which guarantees the truthfulness, individual rationality and computational efficiency. Through extensive simulations, we show that our proposed auction mechanisms with the two bidding schemes can efficiently maximize the social welfare of the blockchain network and provide effective strategies for the cloud/fog computing service provider.
机译:作为新兴的分散式安全数据管理平台,区块链近来获得了很大的普及。为了保持区块链数据记录的规范状态,基于工作量证明的共识协议为网络中称为矿工的节点提供了激励,以通过解决密码学的“区块挖掘”过程来确认新的交易区块难题。在诸如移动设备之类的本地计算资源有限的情况下,对于理性的矿工(即共识节点)而言,将用于计算工作量的计算任务卸载到云/雾计算服务器是很自然的。因此,我们专注于云/雾计算服务提供商与矿工之间的交易,并提出了基于拍卖的市场模型以进行有效的计算资源分配。特别是,我们考虑基于工作量证明的区块链网络,该网络受计算资源的约束,并被部署为分散式数据管理应用程序的基础架构。由于区块链网络中矿工之间的竞争,在设计拍卖机制时尤其要考虑分配外部性。具体来说,我们考虑两种投标方案:固定需求方案(每个矿工竞标固定数量的资源)和多重需求方案(矿工可以提交其优选的需求和投标)。对于定额竞标方案,我们提出了一种能够实现最佳社会福利的拍卖机制。在多需求招标方案中,社会福利最大化问题是NP难题。因此,我们设计了一种保证真实性,个体合理性和计算效率的近似算法。通过广泛的仿真,我们证明了我们提出的带有两种出价方案的拍卖机制可以有效地最大化区块链网络的社会福利,并为云/雾计算服务提供商提供有效的策略。

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