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Efficient Nash Equilibrium Resource Allocation Based on Game Theory Mechanism in Cloud Computing by Using Auction

机译:拍卖中基于博弈论机制的高效纳什均衡资源分配

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摘要

One of the most complex issues in the cloud computing environment is the problem of resource allocation so that, on one hand, the cloud provider expects the most profitability and, on the other hand, users also expect to have the best resources at their disposal considering the budget constraints and time. In most previous work conducted, heuristic and evolutionary approaches have been used to solve this problem. Nevertheless, since the nature of this environment is based on economic methods, using such methods can decrease response time and reducing the complexity of the problem. In this paper, an auction-based method is proposed which determines the auction winner by applying game theory mechanism and holding a repetitive game with incomplete information in a non-cooperative environment. In this method, users calculate suitable price bid with their objective function during several round and repetitions and send it to the auctioneer; and the auctioneer chooses the winning player based the suggested utility function. In the proposed method, the end point of the game is the Nash equilibrium point where players are no longer inclined to alter their bid for that resource and the final bid also satisfies the auctioneer’s utility function. To prove the response space convexity, the Lagrange method is used and the proposed model is simulated in the cloudsim and the results are compared with previous work. At the end, it is concluded that this method converges to a response in a shorter time, provides the lowest service level agreement violations and the most utility to the provider.
机译:云计算环境中最复杂的问题之一是资源分配问题,因此,一方面,云提供商希望获得最大的利润,另一方面,用户也希望拥有可分配的最佳资源预算限制和时间。在之前进行的大多数工作中,启发式和进化式方法已用于解决此问题。但是,由于此环境的性质基于经济方法,因此使用此类方法可以减少响应时间并降低问题的复杂性。本文提出了一种基于拍卖的方法,该方法通过应用博弈论机制并在非合作环境下持有具有不完整信息的重复博弈来确定拍卖获胜者。通过这种方法,用户可以在几次回合和重复中利用其目标函数计算出合适的价格,并将其发送给拍卖商。拍卖师根据建议的效用函数选择获胜者。在建议的方法中,游戏的终点是纳什均衡点,玩家不再倾向于更改其对该资源的出价,而最终出价也满足拍卖人的效用函数。为了证明响应空间的凸性,使用了Lagrange方法,并在cloudimsim中模拟了所提出的模型,并将结果与​​先前的工作进行了比较。最后,得出的结论是,该方法可在较短的时间内收敛到响应,为服务提供者提供最低的服务级别协议违规和最多的实用性。

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  • 期刊名称 other
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  • 年(卷),期 -1(10),10
  • 年度 -1
  • 页码 e0138424
  • 总页数 29
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  • 入库时间 2022-08-21 11:14:25

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