A Learning-Based Solution for an Adversarial Repeated Game in Cyber–Physical Power Systems

摘要

Due to the rapidly expanding complexity of the cyber physical power systems, the probability of a system malfunctioning and failing is increasing. Most of the existing works combining smart grid (SG) security and game theory fail to replicate the adversarial events in the simulated environment close to the real-life events. In this article, a repeated game is formulated to mimic the real-life interactions between the adversaries of the modern electric power system. The optimal action strategies for different environment settings are analyzed. The advantage of the repeated game is that the players can generate actions independent of the previous actions history. The solution of the game is designed based on the reinforcement learning algorithm, which ensures the desired outcome in favor of the players. The outcome in favor of a player means achieving higher mixed strategy payoff compared to the other player. Different from the existing game-theoretic approaches, both the attacker and the defender participate actively in the game and learn the sequence of actions applying to the power transmission lines. In this game, we consider several factors (e.g., attack and defense costs, allocated budgets, and the players strengths) that could affect the outcome of the game. These considerations make the game close to real-life events. To evaluate the game outcome, both players utilities are compared, and they reflect how much power is lost due to the attacks and how much power is saved due to the defenses. The players favorable outcome is achieved for different attack and defense strengths (probabilities). The IEEE 39 bus system is used here as the test benchmark. Learned attack and defense strategies are applied in a simulated power system environment (PowerWorld) to illustrate the postattack effects on the system.