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Experimental Analysis of Guess-and-Determine Attacks on Clock-Controlled Stream Ciphers

机译:时钟控制流密码的猜测和确定攻击的实验分析

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Guess-and-Determine (GD) attacks have recently been proposed for the effective analysis of word-oriented stream ciphers. This paper discusses GD attacks on clock-controlled stream ciphers, which use irregular clocking for a non-linear function. The main focus is the analysis of irregular clocking for GD attacks. We propose GD attacks on a typical clock-controlled stream cipher AA5, and calculate the process complexity of our proposed GD attacks. In the attacks, we assume that the clocking of linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) is truly random. An important consideration affecting the practicality of these attacks is the question of whether these assumptions are realistic. Because in practice, the clocking is determined by the internal states. We implement miniature ciphers to evaluate the proposed attacks, and show that they are applicable. We also apply the GD attacks to other clock controlled stream ciphers and compare them. Finally, we discuss some properties of GD attacks on clock-controlled stream ciphers and the effectiveness of the clock controllers. Our research results contain information that are useful in the design of clock-controlled stream ciphers.
机译:猜测和确定(GD)攻击最近已被提出来有效分析面向单词的流密码。本文讨论了对时钟控制的流密码的GD攻击,这些攻击对非线性函数使用不规则的时钟。主要重点是分析GD攻击的不规则时钟。我们对典型的时钟控制流密码AA5提出了GD攻击,并计算了我们提出的GD攻击的过程复杂性。在攻击中,我们假设线性反馈移位寄存器(LFSR)的时钟是真正随机的。影响这些攻击的实用性的重要考虑因素是这些假设是否现实的问题。因为实际上,时钟是由内部状态决定的。我们实施了微型密码来评估所提议的攻击,并证明它们是适用的。我们还将GD攻击应用于其他时钟控制的流密码并进行比较。最后,我们讨论了GD攻击对时钟控制的流密码的某些属性以及时钟控制器的有效性。我们的研究结果包含的信息可用于设计时钟控制的流密码。

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