Achieving Flatness: Selecting the Honeywords from Existing User Passwords

摘要

Recently, Juels and Rivest proposed honeywords (decoy passwords) to detect attacks against hashed password databases. For each user account, the legitimate password is stored with several honeywords in order to sense impersonation. If honeywords are selected properly, a cyber-attacker who steals a file of hashed passwords cannot be sure if it is the real password or a honeyword for any account. Moreover, entering with a honeyword to login will trigger an alarm notifying the administrator about a password file breach. At the expense of increasing the storage requirement by 20 times, the authors introduce a simple and effective solution to the detection of password file disclosure events. In this study, we scrutinize the honeyword system and present some remarks to highlight possible weak points. Also, we suggest an alternative approach that selects the honeywords from existing user passwords in the system in order to provide realistic honeywords—a perfectly flat honeyword generation method—and also to reduce storage cost of the honeyword scheme.