A Novel Built-In Self-Authentication Technique to Prevent Inserting Hardware Trojans

摘要

With the rapid globalization of the semiconductor industry, hardware Trojans have become a significant threat to government agencies and enterprises that require secure and reliable systems for their critical applications. Because of the diversity of hardware Trojans and the randomness associated with process variations, hardware Trojan detection is a challenging problem. In this paper, we propose a novel technique, called built-in self-authentication (BISA), which can be used to make hardware Trojan insertion by untrusted Graphic Data System (GDSII) developer and untrusted foundry considerably more difficult and easier to detect. The unused spaces in the circuit layout represent the best opportunity to insert Trojans by these entities. BISA works by eliminating this spare space and filling it with functional filler cells, instead of nonfunctional filler cells. A self-testing procedure generates a digital signature that will be different if any BISA cells are changed because of hardware Trojan insertion. We demonstrate that BISA can be applied to any flat or bottom-up hierarchical design with negligible overhead in terms of area, power, and timing.