Towards Privacy Preservation in Strategy-Proof Spectrum Auction Mechanisms for Noncooperative Wireless Networks

摘要

The problem of dynamic spectrum redistribution has been extensively studied in recent years. Auctions are believed to be among the most effective tools to solve this problem. A great number of strategy-proof auction mechanisms have been proposed to improve spectrum allocation efficiency by stimulating bidders to truthfully reveal their valuations of spectrum, which are the private information of bidders. However, none of these approaches protects bidders' privacy. In this paper, we present PRIDE, which is a PRIvacy-preserving anD stratEgy-proof spectrum auction mechanism. PRIDE guarantees -anonymity for both single- and multiple-channel auctions. Furthermore, we enhance PRIDE to provide -diversity, which is an even stronger privacy protection than -anonymity. We not only rigorously prove the economic and privacy-preserving properties of PRIDE, but also extensively evaluate its performance. Our evaluation results show that PRIDE achieves good spectrum redistribution efficiency and fairness with low overhead.