Two-Stage Game Design of Payoff Decision-Making Scheme for Crowdsourcing Dilemmas

摘要

Crowdsourcing uses collective intelligence to finish complicated tasks and is widely applied in many fields. However, the crowdsourcing dilemmas between the task requester and the task completer restrict the efficiency of system severely, e.g., the cooperation dilemma leads to the failure in the interactions and the quality of service dilemma results in the inability of task completer to provide high-quality service. Current research usually focuses on solving only one aforementioned dilemma and fails to integrate perfectly with the service architectural pattern of crowdsourcing systems. In this article, combined with the crowdsourcing interaction phase, we limit the objects that cause dilemma and propose a $oldsymbol {t}$ wo-stage $oldsymbol {g}$ ame $oldsymbol {p}$ ayoff $oldsymbol {d}$ ecision-making scheme ( TGPD ) to overcome these shortcomings. To solve the cooperation dilemma between the requester and the crowdsourcing platform, we first propose a dynamic payment method based on the reputation-quality rules for the task requester, and then develop a cos-evaluation algorithm to estimate platform’s cost, last design a co-determine algorithm to determine whether the platform adopts a cooperative strategy. To address the quality of service dilemma between the crowdsourcing platform and the workers, we first present an auction-screening method to estimate the reasonable recruitment range of workers which can be optimized by the result of cos-evaluation algorithm, and then use a reward distribution method to motivate workers to complete tasks with high quality and on time. The experimental results indicate that our new scheme successfully increases the worker’s and platforms’ payoffs at the same time, improves the accuracy of screening workers, enhances the worker’s quality of service, and decreases the platform’s cost.