Hagen, Kurtis, The Philosophy of Xunzi: A Reconstruction

摘要

Whereas some philosophy books can be so exceedingly complex as to frustrate anynattempt to offer a concise synopsis, Kurtis Hagen admirably maintains a straightforwardnthesis from beginning to end in The Philosophy of Xunzi. Put simply, Hagen argues againstna common theme in recent English-language studies of the Confucian thinker Xunzi 荀子.nSpecifically, he criticizes what he terms the “realist” reading of Xunzi and proposes insteadna “constructivist” interpretation. The “realist” view comprises a variety of elements, but thentwo most important ones for Hagen are, apparently the claims that Xunzi believes (1) therenis a single correct standard for morality and (2) this standard is not man-made, but rathernexists independently of humans. The “constructivist” reading, in contrast, maintains that fornXunzi such standards (1) are man-made, and not simply “given” features of the world, andn(2) more than one such standard is acceptable. Chapter One introduces these two positionsnand argues against the “realist” reading and for the “constructivist” one, focusing parti-ncularly on Xunzi’s discussions of the Way (dao 道). The subsequent chapters then extendnthis approach to other parts of the Xunzi that have often been taken to support a “realist”nview. Chapter Two analyzes Xunzi’s notions of “patterns” (li 理) and “categories” (lei 類),nChapter Three discusses his theory of language and naming, Chapter Four considers hisnconception of ritual, and Chapter Five finishes the book with a treatment of Xunzi’s viewsnon virtue and moral cultivation. The overall effect casts Xunzi as having a highly flexiblenmoral philosophy, one that allows for a wide variety of different moral practices.