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Utility-driven relay for hybrid access femtocells based on cognitive radio spectrum auction

机译:基于认知无线电频谱拍卖的混合接入毫微微小区的公用事业驱动中继

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Femtocells promisingly improve coverage and spectrum efficiency at the edge of macrocell. However, macro users may suffer dead-zone trouble due to strong interference coming from closed access femtocell, or compete spectrum resource with femto users in the open access model. In this paper, we propose a novel utility-driven relay scheme adopted by hybrid access femtocell (HAF) to address the above two issues, wherein the macrocell maximizes the usage of its idle spectrum bands, bided by femtocells, via cognitive radio spectrum auction; and recompense relay expense to stimulate selfish femtocells undertaking HAFs to relay the signal to the vicinal macro user, meanwhile avoiding two-tier interference. Spectrum competition among femtocells is formulated as a static Cournot game provided with global information; then necessarily considered as a dynamic Cournot game of the strategy adapting distributively according to the players previous actions. Furthermore, we introduce a protocol and propose refund factor, spectrum price dynamic adjustment algorithms to achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium, i.e., the solution of the non-cooperative game between macrocell and femtocells. We also prove the existence of equilibrium and the convergence of algorithms. Extensive simulation results show the details of games, which indicate they can match the win-win hybrid access mechanism, benefiting cell-edge macro users for better QoS and higher access opportunities for femto users. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:Femtocell有望改善宏蜂窝边缘的覆盖范围和频谱效率。然而,由于来自封闭式接入毫微微小区的强烈干扰,宏用户可能会遇到死区问题,或者在开放式接入模型中与毫微微用户竞争频谱资源。在本文中,我们提出了一种混合访问型毫微微小区(HAF)采用的新颖的效用驱动中继方案,以解决上述两个问题,其中,宏小区通过认知无线电频谱拍卖最大化由毫微微小区竞标的空闲频谱带的使用;并补偿中继费用,以刺激从事HAF的自私的毫微微小区将信号中继到邻近的宏用户,同时避免两层干扰。毫微微小区之间的频谱竞争被公式化为一个静态的古诺游戏,提供全球信息。则必须将其视为动态的古诺游戏,其策略是根据玩家先前的行为进行分布适应的。此外,我们介绍了一种协议并提出了退款因子,频谱价格动态调整算法,以实现Stackelberg平衡,即宏小区与毫微微小区之间非合作博弈的解决方案。我们还证明了均衡的存在和算法的收敛性。大量的仿真结果显示了游戏的细节,表明它们可以匹配双赢的混合访问机制,从而使小区边缘的宏用户受益于更好的QoS和毫微微用户更高的访问机会。 (C)2015 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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