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IoT-Enabled Parking Space Sharing and Allocation Mechanisms

机译:支持物联网的停车位共享和分配机制

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This paper is among the first proposing an integrated auction and market design method for the parking space sharing and allocation problem. Drivers (agents) who fail to exchange their own parking spaces can then rent them to the platform. The platform receives private parking spaces from agents and manages some public parking spaces. We first develop the urban parking management cloud platform through Internet of Things. Based on this systemic framework, parking spaces are shared among agents via a price-compatible top trading cycles and chains (PC-TTCCs) mechanism and the platform's parking spaces are reassigned via a one-sided Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (O-VCG) auction. Both the PC-TTCC mechanism with rule e (PC-TTCC [e]) and O-VCG auction are effective in terms of strategy-proofness and (allocative or Pareto) efficiency. In the PC-TTCC [e] mechanism, the platform's payment rule used in private parking space sharing is determined based on historical O-VCG auction prices. Our experimental results further show that the proposed mechanism results in system profitability of 20%-30% and ex post budget balance for the platform.
机译:本文是最早提出针对停车位共享和分配问题的集成拍卖和市场设计方法的论文之一。未能交换自己停车位的驾驶员(代理人)可以将其租到平台上。该平台从代理商那里接收私人停车位,并管理一些公共停车位。我们首先通过物联网开发城市停车管理云平台。基于此系统框架,通过价格兼容的最高交易周期和链(PC-TTCC)机制在代理商之间共享停车位,并通过单侧的Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(O-VCG)重新分配平台的停车位。拍卖。具有规则e的PC-TTCC机制(PC-TTCC [e])和O-VCG拍卖在策略可靠性和(分配性或帕累托)效率方面均有效。在PC-TTCC [e]机制中,基于历史O-VCG拍卖价格确定专用停车位共享中使用的平台支付规则。我们的实验结果进一步表明,所提出的机制使系统的系统获利能力达到20 %-30 %,并且事后预算平衡。

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