本文运用委托代理理论、合作博弈和厂商模型, 研究了政府主导的产学研协同创新的利益分配机制.首先, 分析了不同信息结构下企业和科研机构的行为, 讨论了双方的策略和社会福利;然后, 将信息不对称下福利损失看作双方的信息租金进行二次利益分配, 首次建立了政府主导的具有双边激励效应产学研利益分配机制.研究表明, 信息不对称下科研机构的投入水平低于最优投入水平, 具有双边激励效应的分配机制不仅兼顾了企业和科研机构双方的利益、发挥了政府在产学研协同创新利益分配中的引导作用, 也提升了社会整体福利, 有效缓解了信息不对称带来的低效率.%Based on the principal-agent theory, the cooperative game and the firm model, it studied the profit distribution mechanism of the government-led industry-university-institute collaboration innovation. Firstly, it analyzed the behavior of enterprises and scientific research institutes under different information structure, and discussed the strategies and social welfare. Then, it considered the welfare loss under asymmetric information as the information rent of the two sides, and established the profit distribution mechanism of the government-led bilateral incentive effect for the first time. The results show that under asymmetric information, the level of effort of research institutes is lower than the optional level; and under the bilateral incentive mechanism, the interests of both enterprises and scientific research institutes are taken into account, and social welfare is improved. It effectively alleviates the inefficiency caused by asymmetric information.
展开▼
