动态演化博弈视角下的“中国式过马路”问题研究

摘要

以“中国式过马路”现象中有闯红灯倾向的行人为研究对象，分析其过街行为特点，建立了行人过街的动态演化博弈模型，探讨了不同时刻、不同条件下行人的博弈选择策略；在此基础上论证了相应管理措施的有效性。结合数值模拟得到以下结论：（1）在不采取任何惩治措施条件下所有行人倾向于选择直接闯红灯；（2）轻微的惩治措施起不到显著效果，惩治措施达到一定力度后才能对“中国式过马路”现象有所改善；（3）过街行人的策略选择会受到周边行人行为的影响；（4）过长的红灯等待时间会诱发行人选择主动闯红灯的动机。综上四点得到针对性的改善措施：合理设置并优化信号配时，缩短行人过街等待时间，在此基础上加大惩治力度并提高行人总体素质和遵纪守法意识。%Focusing on pedestrians with a tendency to run red lights in the “Chinese-style road crossing”phenom-enon as the research subject,the characteristics of these pedestrians’behaviors are analyzed and a corresponding model is established based on dynamic evolutionary game theory to analyze the game selection strategies at differ-ent moments and conditions and demonstrate the validity of the related management measures.Through numerical simulations several conclusions can be reached as follows:(1 )All pedestrians choose to run red light in situation of no punitive measures;(2)The “Chinese-style road crossing”phenomenon can only be improved when puni-tive measures reach a certain level of intensity,otherwise minor punitive measures achieve no significant effects;(3 )Besides the high-level punitive measures the pedestrian ’s overall quality and law-abiding consciousness should also be enhanced;(4)Unnecessary long red light waiting time can force the road-crossers to run red lights.Following improvement strategies can be obtained correspondingly based on the above analysis:Firstly optimize the signal timing to reasonably shorten the road-crossers’waiting time;and then further enhance the road-crossers’overall quality and law-abiding consciousness while intensifying the punitive measures.