重庆市国有企业高管薪酬的影响因素与激励效应研究

摘要

本文从高管控制权、公司绩效、代理成本三方面入手考察了重庆市国有企业高管薪酬的影响因素与激励效应。实证研究发现：(1)重庆市国有企业高管薪酬与控制权负相关，国企高管无法利用自身控制权影响薪酬制度制定或操纵盈余以提升薪酬水平；(2)重庆市国企高管的薪酬制度设计一定程度上体现出与公司绩效挂钩的特征，但较少考虑到长期绩效表现；(3)在薪酬管制且薪酬水平相对偏低的情况下，国企高管会通过管理费用、在职消费等隐性收入提高自身实际薪酬，增加了企业代理成本。%This article studied the influence factor and incentive effect of Chongqing state-owned enterprises’ executive com-pensation from three respects such as the executive control, corporate performance and agency cost. The empirical research shows that: (1)Chongqing SOEs’ executive compensation have a negative correlation with control, the chief executives of SOEs can’t use their control to affect salary system to enhance the compensation level;(2)Chongqing SOEs’ executive com-pensation system design reflect the “pps” characteristics to some extent, but have little consideration to long-term perfor-mance;(3)In the case of compensation regulation and low compensation level, the chief executives of SOEs improve their ac-tual salary by means of management cost and perks, therefore increased the agency cost of enterprises.