首页> 外文学位 >Power, material incentive, and labor productivity in China's state-owned enterprises.
【24h】

Power, material incentive, and labor productivity in China's state-owned enterprises.

机译:中国国有企业的权力,物质激励和劳动生产率。

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

The dissertation will answer the following three questions through the lens of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs): (1) How has economic reform changed the party-state relationship in China? (2) How has power shifted among different social groups in the factory in the reform era's China? (3) Why is there a persistent decline of productivity of Chinese SOEs?; The dissertation applies the clientelist model in answering these questions. To answer the first question, the dissertation compares two well-known cases of different historic periods and argues that the reform has led to a change of the focus of the party-state relationship from ideological conformity to policy convergence. That is, in dealing with the state units such as SOEs, the Communist Party leaders identify and reward their loyal followers based on their degree of commitment to reform policies during the reform rather than on the ideological zeal.; Using the data from the field work, this dissertation then studies the changing power distribution in the factory and concludes that while the resistance to the policy to separate the party from the factory management has led to different power structures in different regions, middle-level managers emerged as the big beneficiary in the management reform. Workshop floor workers became the most ostensible victims to this ongoing power decentralization in the factory.; From a micro perspective based on the findings from the field work, the dissertation developed a new approach to explain the worsening conditions of Chinese SOEs, as opposed to the prevailing institutional model. It argues that the following two factors have contributed to the SOE's downturn:; First: a continuity of party's tradition to showcase few exemplary factories in order to soar up public support for reform policies has encouraged factory leaders to prioritize policy compliance over raising productivity in the management.; Second: an increasingly disillusioned community of shop floor workers who are caught in a paradox of being excluded from the changed redistribution pattern and still cherishing the idea of the state as their welfare provider.
机译:本文将从中国国有企业的角度回答以下三个问题:(1)经济改革如何改变了中国的党政关系? (2)在改革时代的中国,工厂中不同社会群体之间的权力如何转移? (3)为什么中国国有企业的生产率持续下降?本文在回答这些问题时运用了客户列表模型。为了回答第一个问题,本文比较了两个不同历史时期的著名案例,并认为改革导致党政关系的重点从思想上的顺应转向政策融合。就是说,在与国有企业等国家单位打交道时,共产党领导人根据改革期间对改革政策的承诺程度而不是意识形态热情来确定和奖励他们的忠实拥护者。本文使用现场工作的数据,研究了工厂中不断变化的权力分布,并得出结论,尽管对将政党与工厂管理层分开的政策的抵制导致了不同地区的权力结构不同,但中层管理者在管理改革中成为最大的受益者。车间地板工人成为工厂这种持续权力下放的最明显受害者。从实地考察的结果出发,从微观的角度出发,本文提出了一种新的方法来解释中国国有企业的恶化状况,而不是现行的制度模型。它认为,以下两个因素导致了国有企业的下滑:首先:党的传统的连续性,以展示少数模范工厂以增加公众对改革政策的支持,这鼓励工厂领导者优先考虑政策合规性,而不是提高管理生产率。第二:越来越幻灭的车间工人社区陷入了一种悖论,即被排除在改变的重新分配模式之外,并且仍然珍视国家作为其福利提供者的想法。

著录项

  • 作者

    Yang, Xuchuan.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Utah.;

  • 授予单位 The University of Utah.;
  • 学科 Political Science General.; Sociology Industrial and Labor Relations.; History Asia Australia and Oceania.; Economics Labor.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2001
  • 页码 349 p.
  • 总页数 349
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 政治理论;社会学;世界史;劳动经济;
  • 关键词

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号