我国董事专业性与政治关联性的实证研究

摘要

本文以1995-2005年沪深两市8923个A股上市公司的样本作为对象,实证研究了公司所有权类型、所在地区市场化的程度、制度变迁与董事的专业性、政治关联性的关系。研究发现,当上市公司为国有企业时,董事会中有政治关联的董事较多,但有专业知识的董事较少。如果上市公司处在市场化程度较高的地区时,董事会成员中有政治关联的董事较少,有专业知识的董事较多。随时间的变动和制度变迁,有专业知识的董事数有所增加,但有政治关联的董事人数也同时增加。本文的研究在丰富了公司治理文献的同时,对于了解影响我国董事会构成的因素提供了重要的实证证据。%This paper examines how institutional features of transition economies,i.e.,government ownership and market development distort the choice of directors in China.I argue that directors＇ professionalism is less important for SOEs than non-state firms;rather,SOEs prefer to choose,for ease of collusion,political-connected directors.My results support this conjecture.In addition,market development may change the business rule from＂relation-based＂ to＂market-based＂.By cross-sectional study,I find that the firms located in provinces with better market development are likely to have directors with more professionalism,but less political-connection.From longitude,I find that the directors＇ professionalism improve over the period of 1995 through 2005.However,at the same time,director＇s political connection increases too,which shows that government intervention should not be neglected.