首页> 中文期刊>西安石油大学学报(社会科学版) >论成品油定价机制中的有限规制:基于合谋的视角

论成品油定价机制中的有限规制:基于合谋的视角

     

摘要

The conspiracy behaviours of oil oligarchy manufacturers in the refined oil pricing mechanism are analysed by means of a single phase static game analysis, dynamic game analysis and indefinite dynamic game analysis method. It is found out from the study that benefits obtained by both oil oligarchy manufacturers under the condition of conspiracy are higher than that in the condition of independence. Therefore, there is in- terest inceentive of pricing conspiracy between both sides. Based on this, it can be considered to use limited regulation means in the reform of our national refined oil pricing forming mechanism.%利用单期静态博弈分析法、有限期动态博弈分析法和无限期动态博弈分析法对成品油定价机制中寡头厂商的合谋行为进行了分析。研究发现:两家寡头厂商在合谋条件下的收益均高于双方各自独立定产条件下的收益,因此,双方存在进行价格合谋的利益激励。基于此,我国成品油价格形成机制的改革可以考虑采用有限规制等手段。

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