首页> 中文期刊> 《石家庄铁道大学学报(社会科学版)》 >央企分红、高管在职消费与公司经营绩效

央企分红、高管在职消费与公司经营绩效

         

摘要

Under the frame of state-owned property management in our country, the overlong agent chain causes the high managing cost in state-owned companies.And company-paid consumption is an important part of that cost, which influences central enterprises' business performances directly or indirectly.By building measurement models and using samples from 2012 to 2014, we may find that profit-sharing in state-owned companies can not only control their company-paid consumption, but also raise their performance.In the end the paper proposes some countermeasures for state-owned enterprises based on the research.%在我国国有资产管理的现行框架下,过长的委托代理链条使国有企业运行成本居高不下,央企高管畸高的在职消费是这一运行成本的重要组成部分,直接或间接地影响了央企的经营绩效.为研究该问题,选取2012-2014年我国央企作为研究样本,通过建立央企分红、高管在职消费与公司经营绩效的计量模型,实证分析发现:国企红利分配机制的建构不仅能够有效地抑制高管在职消费,而且通过降低国企代理成本,可以提升企业经营绩效.最后,基于研究结论提出了相关对策建议.

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