顾客集中与管理层治理--基于薪酬契约和代理成本的视角

摘要

本文以创业板上市公司为研究样本，从薪酬契约和代理成本的视角，检验了顾客集中与管理层治理的关系。实证分析结果显示，顾客集中度与高管薪酬和代理成本存在显著负相关关系。结果表明：顾客集中显著影响公司薪酬契约，顾客集中降低了高管薪酬；顾客集中降低代理成本，减轻管理层代理冲突问题。这些研究结论丰富了公司治理的理论内容，同时对于缓解公司代理冲突、改善公司治理矛盾具有重要的现实意义。%Based on the manual data of listed companies on GEM , the paper examines the relationship between customer concentra-tion and management governance on the perspective of compensation contract and agency cost . Studies reveal that customer concentration has a significant negative impact on managerial compensation and agency cost . The results show that :customer concentration significantly influence compensation contracts and reduce executive pay ;customer concentration can reduce agency cost and the management agency conflict problem . Therefore , this study will be meaningful for corporate governance theory . At the same time , it also has an important re-alistic meaning to ease agency conflict and consummate corporate governance mechanism .