首页> 中文期刊>北京交通大学学报(社会科学版) >中国古代运输业官民关系的演化规律及启示--以宋代为例

中国古代运输业官民关系的演化规律及启示--以宋代为例

     

摘要

With an economic analysis of the deteriorating government-people relationship in transport industry in Song dynasty,this paper reveals the evolutionary law of the government-people relation-ship in transport industry based on a Game Evolutionary model.The government is constantly motiva-ted to expand transport public sectors,increase the investment,strengthen the management,and de-crease the profits of nongovernmental transportation subjects.The cost is then transferred to the un-derclass organizations and individuals,which gradually intensifies the social contradictions and nega-tive incentives and disintegrates the industrial system.This is the institutional cause of the changing government-people relationship in transport industry in the past dynasties,which is enlightening to the current structural reform and development of our transportation system.%通过构建运输业官民博弈演化模型,选取宋代运输业官民关系逐步恶化的案例进行经济学分析和验证,揭示中国古代运输业官民关系博弈演化规律。官方一向有动力不断扩大运输业公共部门、加大运输业投资、增加管制强度、干预和挤压民间运输主体的正常经营收益。而巨大的社会成本转移给底层组织和底层民众,逐渐激化社会矛盾形成对体系的负向激励和瓦解力量,成为历代运输业官民关系变化的制度原因。历代运输业官民关系恶化的教训对当前我国运输业的发展与体制改革具有重要启示作用。

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