利用博弈论中的相关原理,研究了由零售商主导的闭环供应链在制造商再制造成本为不对称信息时的运作及协调问题,并与对称信息下的协作机制进行了比较.研究表明:在对称信息和不对称信息下,零售商都可以通过提供特许经营费的方式达到协作目的并获取超额利润.在不对称信息下,再制造节约成本高的制造商将获得信息优势和更高利润,协调机制可以达到对称信息下同样的零售价、回收率和总利润.最后用算例验证了以上结论.%A closed-loop supply chain with retailer as leader is addressed in this paper. For such a supply chain, there is asymmetry for information about the manufacturers' re-manufacturing cost. Came models are developed for analysis of operation and coordination mechanism of the supply chain under both symmetric information and asymmetric information. With the models, comparative study is conducted. Results reveal that retailers can achieve the purpose of collaboration and access to excess profits by providing franchise fee under both asymmetric and symmetric information. Under asymmetric information, manufacturers who are able to save large part of cost by remanufacturing have the information advantages and can gain high profits. Also, in this case, through coordination, a manufacturer can achieve the same retail price, the recovery rate, and total profit as that obtained under symmetric information. Examples are used to verify the proposed method.
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