政府干涉下双渠道营销的闭环供应链协调

摘要

在销售的产品存在价格差异的情形下建立了双渠道营销闭环供应链博弈模型。为了研究政府的干涉措施对双渠道闭环供应链的影响，分别构建了政府干涉前后的分散决策模型，通过求解模型得到了供应链中成员的最优决策及利润，以及制造商利润与政府奖惩力度的临界关系，并以集中决策下的结果作为基准，提出了改进的二部定价契约协调供应链。通过模型之间的比较分析，结合数值算例，得到政府对制造商的干涉措施能够有效提高废旧产品的回收率，而二部定价契约能够有效协调政府干涉下的双渠道闭环供应链。最后，对系统中主要参数进行了灵敏度分析。%Based on game theory,closed-loop supply chain models with dual-channel sales were constructed,in which prod-ucts were sold at different prices for different channels. To study the effect of government intervention on dual-channel closed-loop supply chain, the decentralized supply chain models were constructed before and after the government interven-tion respectively. Each member’s decisions and profits were obtained. The critical relationship of the manufacturer’s profits and the government’s reward and punishment intensity were found. With the equilibrium results under centralized decision-making as a benchmark, a modified two-part pricing contract was designed to coordinate the dual-channel closed-loop supply chain under government intervention. Through the analysis of the models,and combined with numeral example analysis,the conclu-sions showed that government intervention on manufacturers could effectively improve the recycling rate, while the two-part pricing method could coordinate closed-loop supply chain with dual-channel sales under government intervention. Finally,the sensitivity analysis of main parameters of the system was conducted.