为了探究服务水平不同且存在相互竞争的快递公司,在与高铁合作开展高铁快递业务时,各方的策略选择及博弈均衡问题,研究了高铁企业与两个相互竞争且存在服务水平差异的快递公司组成纵向合作联盟的策略选择及博弈均衡,并分析了服务水平差异对博弈均衡结果的影响.研究表明,当快递公司间服务水平差距较小时,会形成两个相互竞争的快递公司都与高铁组成纵向合作联盟的均衡状态;当快递公司间服务水平差距较大时,会出现服务水平较高的快递公司与高铁组成合作联盟,而服务水平较低的快递公司不与高铁合作的均衡状态;随着快递公司间服务水平差距的增大,两种均衡状态下的系统总收益都呈现加速增长态势,而低服务水平快递公司的收益都呈现减速下降态势;在服务水平差距从零逐渐增加的过程中,先是第2种均衡状态的系统总收益超过第1种状态,然后是第2种状态替代第1种状态达到新的均衡.%The strategic choice and game equilibrium of vertical cooperation alliance between a High-Speed Rail (HSR) enterprise and two competing express companies were researched,and the influence of service level's difference on game equilibrium was analyzed.The research showed:the equilibrium state would be that all the two competing express companies form vertical alliances with HSR when the service level gap between two express companies was small;the equilibrium state would be that the express company with higher service level form vertical alliances with HSR when the service level gap was big,and the express company with lower service level did not cooperate with HSR.With the service gap increasing,the total revenue of these two equilibrium states was accelerated rose,and the revenue of express company with lower service level was slowed down.In the process of service level gap gradually increased from zero,the total revenue of the second equilibrium state exceeded the first state,and then the second state replaced the first state to achieve a new equilibrium.
展开▼
