首页> 外文学位 >Essays on the Empirics of School Choice
【24h】

Essays on the Empirics of School Choice

机译:关于择校经验的论文

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

This dissertation is an empirical study of school choice under various perspectives. Chapter 2 looks at school choice from the application perspective. It focuses on assignment mechanisms used by school districts to allocate available seats to students. Chapters 3 and 4 turn to the admission perspective, investigating the consequences of school choice on students' outcomes. Chapter 3 studies the effects on students' academic performance of admission to one type of selective schools, namely elite schools. Chapter 4 explores the mechanisms underlying these effects. The empirical analysis in each chapter of this dissertation is supported by administrative data from Tunisia.;With school choice comes the necessity to devise rules to decide who gets to enroll in a school or academic program when more students express the willingness to attend than the school's capacity allows. Centralized assignment mechanisms based on the deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) are used by school districts around the world to assign students to schools. Theoretical analyses of the DA consider that students are allowed to list all the alternatives of the choice set in their application rankings. However, in virtually all places where these mechanisms are implemented, students are restricted to list only a small number of choices. As a consequence, students need to take their admission chances into account, and be strategic in their choice.;In Tunisia, high school graduates are assigned to university programs using a sequential variant of the DA. Chapter 2 use data on this Tunisian mechanism to empirically examine the effect of enabling students to update their expectations about their admissions probabilities. The sequential implementation induces quasi-experimental variation in the information available to students about remaining vacancies, and allows for the identification of students' preferences and expected admission probabilities.;When students cannot revise their expectations, and relative to a benchmark situation in which students are given perfect information about which programs would admit them, their average indirect utility is decreased by the equivalent of a 41km-increase in the distance home-university ---40% of the median distance traveled by students in the data. While easy to implement, the sequential implementation of the DA procedure reduces this expected utility loss by 67% in Tunisia. The increase in expected welfare is driven by a decrease in the share of students rejected by all their listed choices. Gains disproportionately accrue to low-ability and low-SES students. Counterfactuals suggest that a better targeting of low-priority students by the information provision would increase welfare gains.;Underlying school choice is the idea that giving students and their family more freedom in their schooling decisions can improve academic outcomes. Although documented in many papers, the impact of attending a better school on future achievement is unclear and varies greatly depending on the context. Chapter 3 examines the impact of being admitted to a high school with high achieving peers in Tunisia, particularly on post-secondary choices. The admission mechanism creates admission cutoffs that we exploit in a sharp regression discontinuity (RD) design. However, despite the validity of the RD design, sample selection and measurement error induce the standard RDD identification argument to fail, and the naive RD techniques to produce biased estimates. Chapter 3 proposes bounds for the local average and quantile treatment effects. Results suggest that admission to an elite high school increases students' end-of-high-school performance, and the selectivity level of post-secondary programs students in the higher end of the distribution get assigned to.;Chapter 4 investigates one type of mechanisms possibly driving the effect of selective high schools on students' outcomes: the change in educational inputs induced by admission to an elite school. To explore this mechanism, we link the students database to data on schools infrastructures and teachers. Allowing effects of admission to an elite high school to vary across the twelve Tunisian elite high school institutions, we evaluate the link between the magnitude of the treatment effects on students' outcomes, and the intensity with which treatment modifies various dimensions of the school environment. Results suggest that, although average teachers' quality and student monitoring are increased by admission to an elite high school, the higher peer achievement seems to be the main mediator of treatment effects on students' outcomes.
机译:本文是从不同角度对学校选择的实证研究。第2章从应用程序角度探讨学校的选择。它着重于学区用于为学生分配可用座位的分配机制。第3章和第4章从入学角度出发,研究学校选择对学生成绩的影响。第三章研究了一种精英学校对录取学生的学习成绩的影响。第4章探讨了这些影响的潜在机制。论文各章中的实证分析得到了突尼斯的行政数据的支持。随着学校的选择,有必要制定规则来决定谁愿意参加比其他学校更愿意参加的学校或学术课程的人容量允许。世界各地的学区都使用基于递延接受算法(DA)的集中式分配机制来分配学生到学校。对DA的理论分析认为,允许学生在其应用排名中列出选择集的所有替代方案。但是,在几乎所有实施了这些机制的地方,学生都只能列出少数选择。因此,学生需要考虑录取机会,并在选择策略时有策略性。在突尼斯,高中毕业生使用连续的DA分配给大学课程。第2章使用有关突尼斯机制的数据,以实证检验了使学生更新其对录取概率的期望的效果。顺序实施会导致学生可获得的有关剩余职位空缺的信息的准实验变化,并允许确定学生的偏好和预期的入学概率。当学生无法修改其期望时,以及相对于学生所处的基准情况如果给出了有关哪些程序可以接受这些程序的完美信息,则它们的平均间接效用将减少相当于大学距离的41公里-数据中学生所乘平均距离的-40%。虽然易于实施,但在突尼斯,按顺序实施DA程序可使预期的公用事业损失减少了67%。预期福利的增加是由被所有列出的选择拒绝的学生所占比例下降所驱动。低能力和低社会经济地位的学生获得的收益不成比例。反事实表明,通过提供信息来更好地针对低优先级学生将增加福利。;在学校的基础上选择是给学生及其家人更多的学习决定自由,可以改善学业。尽管在许多论文中都有记录,但升读一所更好的学校对未来成就的影响尚不清楚,并且视情况而定。第3章考察了突尼斯高等学府入读一所高中的影响,特别是中学后的选择。准入机制会创建准入截止点,我们将在急剧的回归不连续性(RD)设计中加以利用。然而,尽管RD设计的有效性,但样本选择和测量错误导致标准RDD识别参数失败,并且朴素的RD技术产生了偏差估计。第三章提出了局部平均和分位数处理效果的界限。结果表明,录取精英高中可以提高学生的高中毕业表现,并且分配更高的中学后课程的学生的选择水平也得到了分配。第四章研究了一种机制可能会推动选择性高中对学生成绩的影响:入读精英学校所引起的教育投入的变化。为了探索这种机制,我们将学生数据库链接到有关学校基础设施和教师的数据。考虑到在突尼斯的十二所精英高中机构中录取精英中学的效果各不相同,我们评估了治疗效果对学生成果的影响程度与治疗改变学校环境各个维度的强度之间的联系。结果表明,尽管通过录取精英高中可以提高教师的平均素质和对学生的监控,但较高的同伴成绩似乎是治疗对学生成绩产生影响的主要媒介。

著录项

  • 作者

    Luflade, Margaux.;

  • 作者单位

    Duke University.;

  • 授予单位 Duke University.;
  • 学科 Economics.;Behavioral psychology.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2018
  • 页码 218 p.
  • 总页数 218
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号