The Occasions of Community: Giambattista Vico and the Concept of Society.

摘要

This dissertation provides a systematic account of the development of Giambattista Vico's conception of society as it is presented primarily in his Inaugural Orations, Universal Law, and New Science. Three claims remain constant between these three works: (1) Humans are essentially social, (2) Humans do not cause society, but rather occasion it, and (3) the task of the philosopher is to promote humanity's social nature in the face of the otherwise destructive and anti-social impulses brought about as a result of original sin. Many additional features of Vico's conception of society anticipate the modern conception of society that made the social sciences possible. As with modern conceptions of society, Vico's is as a thing separable both from the state and from the individuals that make it up. But Vico's theological commitments prevent him from being interested in society for its own sake. A defining feature of the modern concept of society is a secularism that finds explanations for social phenomena in society itself. Vico is unwavering in his theological commitments. For Vico, society is not an active agent that produces social effects, but is rather a passive aggregate of individuals that is acted upon by a force that is outside of itself: Divine Providence. For this reason, it is argued that Vico's conception of society is not yet modern.