THE FRENCH STATE AND FRENCH PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1938: A STUDY OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

摘要

This dissertation examines the relationship between the French foreign ministry, as well as other branches of the state, and French private foreign investors during the interwar period. I chose the case of Czechoslovakia because of that state's pivotal position in French diplomacy, its relatively advanced economy and the identity of the French investors--leading banks and corporations. Sources include French and other governmental archives and documents of the French corporations most active in Czechoslovakia. I evaluate these and other materials with respect to conflicting theories on economic aspects of imperialism (Lenin and Schumpeter), C. Wright Mills' "power elite" concept and the historical background of French foreign investment before 1914.;After the First World War the Quai d'Orsay directed French capital towards opportunities in east Central Europe to reinforce alliances there. Placements in Czechoslovak heavy industry, mining and banking came early and were to be more successful than those in France's other eastern allies. The most important acquisitions were the Skoda Works and B.u.H., a coal-steel combine in the disputed Teschen region (which Poland also claimed). The Schneider group (Le Creusot-Banque de l'Union Parisienne) took control of both from Austrian hands in 1919-1920 and retained it for nearly two decades. The Munich crisis of 1938 doomed the French private investments in Czechoslovakia, some of which had been quite profitable. Although the Schneider group tried to regain its holdings in 1945, Czechoslovakia's nationalization program blocked that effort.;In connection with both Skoda and B.u.H. the Schneider group resisted the Quai d'Orsay's urgings to serve the "national interest." The French state especially valued Skoda, one of Europe's major arsenals, but its influence on the concern was limited. French banks were similarly uncooperative. Nonetheless, when investor interests were threatened, French diplomacy intervened--on occasion rather forcefully--in Prague on their behalf. Finally, despite the longstanding informal connections between the Quai d'Orsay and the private investing institutions, French economic diplomacy was effective only when their interests largely coincided. The private investors could count on the support of the French state without having to surrender any of the freedom of action they so highly prized.