This dissertation investigates the effects of firms' technological positions in shaping the formation of inter-firm strategic alliances, the rate of innovation, and the intensity of firms' innovative efforts. The thesis begins by developing a social networks-based conception of a firm's technological position, and concludes with empirical chapters that: (1) trace the evolution of firms' technological positions; (2) test for a relationship between firms' technological positions and the pattern of inter-firm, technology alliances; and (3) estimate the effects of different attributes of firms' technological position on their rates of innovation.;The thesis draws from a data set that describes the 150 largest semiconductor firms from 1976 to 1993. In addition to basic descriptors such as sales, age, and nationality, the data set contains information on 30,000 semiconductor patents awarded to the sample members, and it includes detailed information on the formation of approximately 4000 strategic alliances among semiconductor firms.;The thesis hypothesizes that technological generalist and specialist firms engage in alliances for different strategic motives. Specialist firms are argued to use alliances to avoid duplicative R&D, to coordinate the competition in their niches, and to acquire technological inputs that are relevant to their niches. Generalist firms are argued to use alliances to acquire new technologies and skills that they did not previously possess and which are useful outside of their areas of previous concentrations. These hypotheses are supported in a statistical analysis of the formation of alliances in all potential pairs of semiconductor firms in each year of the data.;The principal argument of the rate of innovation study is that the technological crowding of a firm's position is a determinant of both its rate of innovation and its R&D intensity. The thesis posits that the competitive consequence of technological crowding is an increase in rates of innovation. However, at extreme levels, the positive effect of technological crowding begins to taper, because firms' technological positions become so crowded that the potential for new inventions is saturated. A statistical analysis of firms' annual rate of patenting supports these and related hypotheses.
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