The power of persuasion: Sources of convergence in 'weak' institutions.

摘要

Weak institutions are institutions that show low levels of obligation, delegation, and precision, and that lack formal enforcement mechanisms. They are increasingly common in the international system, but little work analyzes them as a distinct form of cooperation. The work that does address them tends to treat them as poor imitations of traditional institutions and expects them to have little real effect. This dissertation analyzes the relative impact of two such institutions, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering and the Open Method of Coordination on Social Inclusion, to better understand the conditions under which weak institutions can be most effective. Using a process tracing approach and drawing on interviews with participants and an analysis of public and private documents related to each institution, this dissertation argues that weak institutions can be powerful tools of convergence. Those likely to be most effective are hybrid institutions, relying primarily on social mechanisms, especially persuasion, to achieve convergence, but able to enforce the central norms when necessary. Attempts to secure convergence through enforcement without attempts at persuasion are less effective.;This research yields three main lessons about weak institutions. First, the rules of the game in weak institutions are constructed, not determined exogenously by the structure of the problem. Leadership and policy entrepreneurship are key to that construction process. Second, weak institutions, when they work as hybrid institutions, can be highly effective, even in sensitive policy fields. Third, social mechanisms are effective at eliciting convergence in weak institutions and likely more so than enforcement or coercion.;These results also suggest that persuasion enhances enforcement in three ways. It helps members distinguish "felony" from "misdemeanor" non-compliance and allows them to shape the most appropriate response. A system built around persuasion also helps generate the normative convergence necessary to overcome the collective action problems associated with enforcement. Finally, a fundamentally persuasive system legitimizes the decision to enforce and thus reduces resistance not only from the international community, but also from the target. The net effect is that a primary reliance on persuasion likely will make enforcement more acceptable and more effective, but less frequent.