The project of this essay is to sustain and defend a quasi-direct realist--or "objectivist"--reading of Kant on the immediate contents of consciousness, as well as to explain the role of representations (Vorstellungen) in Kant's epistemology.;In chapter one, I characterize the two available interpretations of Kant's Second Analogy. According to the objectivist interpretation, Kant's cognizer has immediate access to appearances and her knowledge of appearances requires no inference from or act of conceptualization upon mediating entities. According to the subjectivist interpretation, Kant's cognizer has immediate access only to representations (where representations are understood as sensa) and her knowledge of appearances requires an inference from or act of conceptualization upon these representations.;In chapter two, I examine important objectivist interpretations of the Second Analogy--in particular, the accounts of Beck and Buchdahl. Beck denies that representations play any role in Kant's argument. Buchdahl provides an analogical account of the role of representations; on his account, Kant invokes representations only by way of providing an analogy. On the basis of certain textual considerations, I conclude that neither account is adequate.;In chapter three, I examine the many versions of the subjectivist interpretation of the Second Analogy. After exploring Strawson's interpretation--including his famous charge of non sequitur--I argue that it rests upon a misunderstanding of the character of Kant's argument. I then turn to alternative subjectivist interpretations: Guyer's interpretation, as well as phenomenalist and anti-phenomenalist interpretations. While it is true that these accounts avoid the traditional charge of non sequitur, I argue that they fall prey to a modified version of the charge, a certain non sequitur regarding empirical knowledge. Furthermore, remarks made in the Refutation of Idealism and Fourth Paralogism clearly indicate that Kant adheres to the objectivist conception of the immediate contents of consciousness.;In chapter four, I contend that subjectivist interpretations rest upon a faulty supposition. Subjectivist interpreters suppose that because subjectively ordered representations play a role in the Second Analogy, they are posited by Kant as the immediate contents of consciousness. I argue that this inference is illicit.;Finally, in chapter five, I offer and defend my own interpretation of Kant's conception of the immediate contents of consciousness, a modest objectivist interpretation. It is objectivist because it affirms that appearances compose the immediate contents of consciousness. It is modest because, unlike the accounts of Beck and Buchdahl, it provides representations with an important role in Kant's epistemology. Representations are not immediately given in experience; rather they must be abstracted from experience in order to determine which a priori concepts and principles are conditions of possible experience. Thus, the role of representations is limited to Kant's account of a priori knowledge.
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