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TPAHS: A Truthful and Profit Maximizing Double Auction for Heterogeneous Spectrums

机译:TPAHS:真实且利润最大化的异构频谱双拍卖

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摘要

In recent years, the auction has been widely applied in wireless communications for spectrum allocation, so that spectrum owners can lease their unutilized spectrum to secondary users. Both primary users and secondary users can get benefit from the auction. Moreover, the spectrum utilization is improved. Existing auction mechanisms either do not consider the heterogeneity of spectrums or pay little attention to the auction's economic efficiency. In this paper, we propose a Truthful and Profit maximizing double Auction for Heterogeneous Spectrums (TPAHS), which simultaneously considers spectrum heterogeneity and economic efficiency. Moreover, different from the most existing spectrum auction mechanisms which are based on interference graph, we consider a more realistic SINR (Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio) model. We prove that TPAHS is truthful, individual-rational, budget-balanced and the experiments show that TPAHS improves the auctioneer's profit significantly.
机译:近年来,拍卖已广泛用于频谱分配的无线通信中,因此频谱所有者可以将其未使用的频谱租借给二级用户。主要用户和次要用户都可以从拍卖中受益。此外,提高了频谱利用率。现有的拍卖机制要么不考虑频谱的异质性,要么不重视拍卖的经济效率。在本文中,我们提出了“异质频谱的真实和利润最大化”双重拍卖(TPAHS),同时考虑了频谱异质性和经济效率。此外,与大多数现有的基于干扰图的频谱拍卖机制不同,我们考虑了更现实的SINR(信号与干扰加噪声比)模型。我们证明了TPAHS是真实,个人理性,预算平衡的,并且实验表明TPAHS显着提高了拍卖商的利润。

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