A Truthful Multi-Channel Double Auction Mechanism for Heterogeneous Spectrums

摘要

Auction has been widely used to spectrum allocation. Most of the previous works supposed that all the spectrum are identical. However, in reality, spectrums are quite different in different locations and frequencies. Recently, some works studied the double auction mechanism for heterogeneous spectrums. But their schemes are based on the assumption of "single-channel request". To be more realistic, each seller and buyer will bid at least one channel. The previous schemes will not work under multi-channel assumption. In this paper, we propose a truthful multi-channel double auction mechanism for heterogeneous spectrums. Our scheme allows sellers and buyers to sell or buy multi-channels for heterogeneous spectrums. We introduce a novel virtual grouping method to split sellers and buyers. We prove that the proposed scheme satisfies the economic properties: truthfulness, individual rationality and budget balance. The simulation results confirm that our method achieves high auction efficiency and auction revenue.