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The Relationship between Manager Ownership, Government Subsidies and Investment Incomes Based on the Ownership Structure of Manufacture Industry

机译:基于制造业所有权结构的经理人所有权,政府补贴与投资收益之间的关系

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摘要

This paper classifies companies into two categories (from distress to normal, from distress to worse) according to the change trend of financial distress. By comparing these two kinds of companies, this paper explores the relationship among manager ownership, government subsidies and the investment income. The evidence suggests that, under the circumstance of different degree of checks and balances of the ownership structure, the financial subsidies and the management shares play different roles. Companies with lower degree of checks and balances, their investment income is significant negative to government subsidies, the management' shares and the largest shareholder' shares, and the investment income is significant positive to the tradable shares of top five shareholders. However, Companies with higher degree of checks and balances, their investment income is positive to government subsidies, the proportion of management shares and the second -largest shares, and this kind of company easily get out of financial distress.
机译:根据财务困境的变化趋势,将公司分为两类(从困境到正常,从困境到更糟)。通过对这两种公司的比较,本文探讨了经理人所有权,政府补贴与投资收益之间的关系。有证据表明,在所有权结构制衡程度不同的情况下,财政补贴和管理层股份起着不同的作用。制衡度较低的公司,其投资收益对政府补贴,管理层的股份和最大股东的股份有重大不利影响,而投资收益对前五名股东的可流通股份有重大影响。但是,制衡程度较高的公司,其投资收益对政府补贴,管理股份和第二大股份的比例是正向的,这种公司很容易摆脱财务困境。

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