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The Relationship between Manager Ownership, Government Subsidies and Investment Incomes Based on the Ownership Structure of Manufacture Industry

机译:基于制造业所有权结构的经理所有权,政府补贴和投资收入之间的关系

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摘要

This paper classifies companies into two categories (from distress to normal, from distress to worse) according to the change trend of financial distress. By comparing these two kinds of companies, this paper explores the relationship among manager ownership, government subsidies and the investment income. The evidence suggests that, under the circumstance of different degree of checks and balances of the ownership structure, the financial subsidies and the management shares play different roles. Companies with lower degree of checks and balances, their investment income is significant negative to government subsidies, the management' shares and the largest shareholder' shares, and the investment income is significant positive to the tradable shares of top five shareholders. However, Companies with higher degree of checks and balances, their investment income is positive to government subsidies, the proportion of management shares and the second -largest shares, and this kind of company easily get out of financial distress.
机译:本文根据财务困境的变化趋势分类公司分为两类(从遇险到正常,从遇险到差)。通过比较这两类公司,本文探讨经理所有权,政府补贴和投资收益之间的关系。有证据表明,在不同程度的检查和所有制结构的余额的情况下,财政补贴和管理股扮演不同的角色。公司以较低程度的制衡,其投资收益显著负的政府补贴,管理的股票和大股东的股票,而投资收益是显著积极的前五大股东的流通股。然而,公司具有较高程度的制衡,它们的投资收益为正,以政府补贴,管理股和第二-largest股比例,而这类公司轻松获得财务困境了。

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