Application of Principal-agent Model to the Management of State-owned Assets inChina

摘要

An effective and restrained incentive mechanism isessential to the governance of the state-owned enterprises.Based on the deep analysis of the principal-agent model andthe strategy model, this article analyzed the influence of theowners and operators of state-owned assets who pursue fortheir own maximum utility to the business activities.Combining with the updated theory concerningagent-incentive, it improved the principal-agent strategymodel under incomplete information. Consequently, itanalyzed the application of these models to the management ofthe state-owned assets of China, especially state-ownedenterprises. Based on the present situation of state-ownedassets' management in China, it analyzed the deficiencies ofthese models, and gives several suggestions on improving theprincipal-agent relationship as well as the incentive andrestrained mechanism in the management of state-ownedassets of China.