首页> 外文会议>International meeting on severe accident assessment and management 2012: Lessons learned from fukushima dai-ichi >FROM A LOOP TO A FUKUSHIMA-LIKE SBO: ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF BWR3-MARKI SAFETY SYSTEMS
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FROM A LOOP TO A FUKUSHIMA-LIKE SBO: ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF BWR3-MARKI SAFETY SYSTEMS

机译:从一环到一个像福岛这样的SBO:BWR3-MARKI安全系统的效果评估

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The Fukushima accident on March 11th 2011, largely affected nuclear community all over the world. Immediately, many R&D organizations and companies drew their attention to the facts that were being released by Japanese authorities, so that the most thorough understanding of the situation could be gained. CIEMAT joined this worldwide initiative by launching a specific activity on analyzing BWR3-MarkI behavior under "Fukushima-like" scenarios with the MELCOR 1.8.6 code. The focus has been given to the impact that availability of different safety systems would have had in the accident progression. Six scenarios have been analyzed based on an SBO sequence. The analyses performed do not allow setting exhaustive comparisons to the available data due to the specific differences between the plant modeled and the Unit-1 Fukushima Daiichi NPP (i.e., set-points, specific volumes ...). Nevertheless, all in all, predictions seem qualitatively consistent with the observations and interpretations of the accident, as the early core degradation or the substantial amount of H_2 production among others. According to RPV pressure, the most likely scenarios in Fukushima would have been those involving a short or no operation of IC and the SRV performance as designed. These two cases show also containment pressure peaks around 11 - 12 h, as recorded, but all the scenarios failed to keep a nearly steady containment pressure around 0.7 -0.8 MPa during the next 12 h, since in all of them containment loss of leak-tightness and/or venting have been predicted. Two other facts emerging from this analysis are the outstanding difference that even a reduced power availability might have had and, no less important, the key role played by the suppression pool as a source term mitigating feature.
机译:2011年3月11日发生的福岛核事故,在很大程度上影响了全世界的核社区。立即,许多研发组织和公司提请他们注意日本当局发布的事实,以便对情况有最透彻的了解。 CIEMAT通过使用MELCOR 1.8.6代码启动了一项特定活动来分析“类福岛”情景下的BWR3-MarkI行为,从而加入了这一全球倡议。重点已放在不同安全系统的可用性对事故进展的影响上。基于SBO序列已分析了六个方案。由于所模拟的工厂与1号机组福岛第一核电站之间的特定差异(即设定点,比容... ...),因此进行的分析不允许对可用数据进行详尽的比较。尽管如此,总的来说,预测似乎与事故的观察和解释在质量上是一致的,因为早期岩心退化或大量的H_2产生。根据RPV的压力,福岛最有可能发生的情况是涉及IC短时或不运行以及设计的SRV性能的情况。根据记录,这两种情况还显示了11-12小时左右的安全壳压力峰值,但是在所有情况下,在接下来的12小时内都无法将稳定的安全壳压力保持在0.7 -0.8 MPa左右,因为在所有这些情况下,泄漏的安全壳损失已经预料到气密性和/或通风。从此分析中得出的另外两个事实是,即使电源可用性降低,也可能具有显着差异,同样重要的是,抑制池作为源术语缓解功能发挥了关键作用。

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