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Voting in the Medieval Papacy and Religious Orders

机译:在中世纪的教皇和宗教秩序中投票

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We take institutions seriously as both a rational response to dilemmas in which agents found themselves and a frame to which later rational agents adapted their behaviour in turn. Medieval corporate bodies knew that they needed choice procedures. Although the social choice advances of ancient Greece and Rome were not rediscovered until the high middle ages, the rational design of choice institutions predated their rediscovery and took some new paths. Both Ramon Llull (ca 1232-1316) and Nicolaus of Cusa (a.k.a Cusanus; 1401-64) made contributions which had been believed to be centuries more recent. Llull promotes the method of pairwise comparison, and proposes the Copeland rule to select a winner. Cusanus proposes the Borda rule, which should properly be renamed the Cusanus rule. Voting might be needed in any institution ruled by more than one person, where decisions could not simply be handed down from above. Medieval theologians no doubt believed that God's word was handed down from above; but they well knew that they often had to decide among rival human interpretations of it. The Church faced its own decision problem every time a new Pope needed to be elected. Bodies not directly in the hierarchy of the Church had to evolve their own decision procedures. The chief such bodies were commercial and urban corporations; religious orders; and universities. The disagreement between Llull and Cusanus raises the issue: should voting be regarded as a method of aggregating judgments or as a method of aggregating interests? In the former interpretation (only), voting procedures are a solution to a problem of approximate reasoning. There is an unknown, true state of affairs (for medieval thinkers, divine will). A voting procedure aggregates unreliable individual perceptions of the will of God to a more reliable group judgment of it. In the rougher world of Cusanus, and probably of electors to the papacy and to Dogeships, only at most lip service is paid to the will of God, and voting is a process of aggregating interests.
机译:我们认真对待制度,既是对困境的理性反应,在这种困境中,特工发现了自己,而后来的理性行为者又将其适应于他们的行为。中世纪的法人团体知道他们需要选择程序。尽管直到高中世纪才重新发现了古希腊和罗马的社会选择进步,但是选择机构的合理设计早于它们的重新发现,并且走了一些新道路。拉蒙·鲁尔(Ramon Llull)(ca 1232-1316)和库萨(Cusa)的尼古拉(Nicolaus)(又名Cusanus; 1401-64)都做出了贡献,这被认为是最近几个世纪了。 Llull提出了成对比较的方法,并提出了Copeland规则来选择获胜者。 Cusanus提出了Borda规则,应将其正确重命名为Cusanus规则。在由一个以上的人统治的任何机构中,可能都需要投票,而决策不能简单地由上而下。毫无疑问,中世纪的神学家相信上帝的话是从上流传下来的。但他们深知,他们常常不得不在对立的人类解释中做出决定。每次需要选举新教皇时,教会都会面临自己的决策问题。不在教会等级中的机构必须发展自己的决策程序。这些机构的主要负责人是商业和城市公司。宗教命令;和大学。鲁尔和库萨努斯之间的分歧提出了一个问题:应将投票视为汇总判断的方法还是汇总利益的方法?在前一种解释中(仅),投票程序是对近似推理问题的一种解决方案。有一种未知的真实状态(对于中世纪的思想家来说,是神圣的意志)。投票程序会使个人对上帝旨意的不可靠看法聚合在一起,从而使团体对它的判断更加可靠。在坎萨努斯的艰难世界中,可能是罗马教皇和总督制的选民,至多只有口头上的服务才符合上帝的旨意,而投票是凝聚利益的过程。

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