首页> 外文OA文献 >Deploying DNSSEC in islands of security
【2h】

Deploying DNSSEC in islands of security

机译:在安全岛中部署DNssEC

代理获取
本网站仅为用户提供外文OA文献查询和代理获取服务,本网站没有原文。下单后我们将采用程序或人工为您竭诚获取高质量的原文,但由于OA文献来源多样且变更频繁,仍可能出现获取不到、文献不完整或与标题不符等情况,如果获取不到我们将提供退款服务。请知悉。

摘要

The Domain Name System (DNS), a name resolution protocol is one of the vulnerable network protocols that has been subjected to many security attacks such as cache poisoning, denial of service and the 'Kaminsky' spoofing attack. When DNS was designed, security was not incorporated into its design. The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) provides security to the name resolution process by using public key cryptosystems. Although DNSSEC has backward compatibility with unsecured zones, it only offers security to clients when communicating with security aware zones. Widespread deployment of DNSSEC is therefore necessary to secure the name resolution process and provide security to the Internet. Only a few Top Level Domains (TLD's) have deployed DNSSEC, this inherently makes it difficult for their sub-domains to implement the security extensions to the DNS. This study analyses mechanisms that can be used by domains in islands of security to deploy DNSSEC so that the name resolution process can be secured in two specific cases where either the TLD is not signed or the domain registrar is not able to support signed domains. The DNS client side mechanisms evaluated in this study include web browser plug-ins, local validating resolvers and domain look-aside validation. The results of the study show that web browser plug-ins cannot work on their own without local validating resolvers. The web browser validators, however, proved to be useful in indicating to the user whether a domain has been validated or not. Local resolvers present a more secure option for Internet users who cannot trust the communication channel between their stub resolvers and remote name servers. However, they do not provide a way of showing the user whether a domain name has been correctly validated or not. Based on the results of the tests conducted, it is recommended that local validators be used with browser validators for visibility and improved security. On the DNS server side, Domain Look-aside Validation (DLV) presents a viable alternative for organizations in islands of security like most countries in Africa where only two country code Top Level Domains (ccTLD) have deployed DNSSEC. This research recommends use of DLV by corporates to provide DNS security to both internal and external users accessing their web based services.
机译:域名系统(DNS)是一种名称解析协议,它是易受攻击的网络协议之一,已遭受许多安全攻击,例如缓存中毒,拒绝服务和“ Kaminsky”欺骗攻击。在设计DNS时,安全性并未纳入其设计中。 DNS安全扩展(DNSSEC)通过使用公共密钥密码系统为名称解析过程提供安全性。尽管DNSSEC与不安全区域具有向后兼容性,但它仅在与具有安全意识的区域进行通信时为客户端提供安全性。因此,必须广泛部署DNSSEC以保护名称解析过程并为Internet提供安全性。仅少数顶级域(TLD)部署了DNSSEC,这从本质上使它们的子域难以实现DNS的安全扩展。这项研究分析了安全孤岛中的域可以用来部署DNSSEC的机制,以便可以在两种特殊情况下确保名称解析过程的安全,即TLD未签名或域注册服务商不支持签名的域。本研究评估的DNS客户端机制包括Web浏览器插件,本地验证解析器和域后备验证。研究结果表明,如果没有本地验证解析器,Web浏览器插件将无法单独运行。但是,事实证明,Web浏览器验证器对于向用户指示域是否已验证非常有用。本地解析器为无法信任其存根解析器与远程名称服务器之间的通信通道的Internet用户提供了一种更安全的选择。但是,它们不提供向用户显示域名是否已正确验证的方法。根据执行的测试结果,建议将本地验证器与浏览器验证器一起使用,以提高可见性并提高安全性。在DNS服务器端,域后备验证(DLV)为安全岛中的组织(如非洲大多数国家/地区)提供了可行的替代方案,在非洲大多数国家中,只有两个国家/地区代码顶级域(ccTLD)部署了DNSSEC。这项研究建议公司使用DLV为访问其基于Web的服务的内部和外部用户提供DNS安全。

著录项

  • 作者

    Murisa Wesley Vengayi;

  • 作者单位
  • 年度 2013
  • 总页数
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 English
  • 中图分类

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号