It starts to rain and I open the umbrella or, if I don"thave one, I ask my colleague, who is walking with me, if hehas an umbrella in the bag. Why do I do so? There aremany ways to answer this question, but if I adopt thestrategy to explain the causes of my acting or speaking bylooking for the reasons that I have for doing it (for instance,I notice that it is raining and I don"t want to get wet), Icommit myself to an explanation of a psychological kind(Davidson 1980).The following discussion tackles an internalproblem of psychological explanations concerning thetaxonomy (or categorization) of intentional contents.Intentional contents define what beliefs, desires, hopes,etc., are about. One believes that something is so-and-so(for instance, one believes that it is raining); one desiresthat something is going to be so-and–so (that tomorrow itisn"t going to rain), etc. The content of intentional states isthe object of those so-called that-clauses: "it is raining" is,for instance, the content of the belief that it is raining.
展开▼
