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When the Going Gets Tough... Financial Incentives, Duration of Unemployment and Job-Match Quality

机译:当艰难前行......财务激励,失业持续时间和工作匹配质量

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摘要

In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the Spanish government reduced the replacement rate (RR) from 60% to 50% after 180 days of unemployment for all spells beginning on July 15, 2012. Using Social Security data and a Differences-in-Differences approach, we find that reducing the RR by 10 percentage points (or 17%) increases workers' odds of finding a job by at least 41% relative to similar workers not affected by the reform. To put it differently, the reform reduced the mean expected unemployment duration by 5.7 weeks (or 14%), implying an elasticity of 0.86. We find strong behavioral effects as the reform reduced the expected unemployment duration right from the beginning of the unemployment spell. While the reform had no effect on wages, it did not decrease other measures of post-displacement job-match quality. After 15 months, the reform decreased unemployment insurance expenditures by 16%, about half of which are explained by job seekers' behavioral changes.
机译:在大萧条之后,西班牙政府自2012年7月15日起对所有法术失业180天后,将替代率(RR)从60%降低至50%。使用社会保障数据和差异我们发现,相对于未受改革影响的类似工人,将RR降低10个百分点(或17%)会增加工人找工作的几率至少41%。换句话说,改革将平均预期失业时间减少了5.7周(或14%),这意味着弹性为0.86。随着改革从失业法开始之初就减少了预期的失业时间,我们发现了强烈的行为影响。尽管这项改革对工资没有影响,但并没有减少其他替代工作岗位匹配质量的措施。 15个月后,这项改革将失业保险支出减少了16%,其中大约一半由求职者的行为改变所解释。

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