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Benefit reentitlement conditions in unemployment insurance schemes

机译:在失业保险计划中享受重新入息条件

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摘要

Unemployment insurance schemes include conditions on past employment history as part of the eligibility conditions. This aspect is often neglected in the literature which primarily focuses on benefit levels and benefit duration. In a search-matching framework we show that benefit duration and employment requirements are substitute instruments in affecting job search incentives and thus gross unemployment. We analyse the optimal design of the unemployment insurance system (benefit levels, duration and employment requirements) under a utilitarian social welfare function. Simulations show that a higher insurance motive captured by more risk aversion implies higher benefit generosity and more lax employment requirements but also shortened benefit duration.
机译:失业保险计划将过去的工作经历条件作为资格条件的一部分。这方面在文献中通常被忽略,其主要集中在收益水平和收益持续时间上。在搜索匹配框架中,我们表明,福利期限和就业要求是影响求职动机并进而影响总失业率的替代工具。我们分析了功利性社会福利功能下的失业保险制度的最佳设计(福利水平,期限和就业要求)。模拟表明,更多的风险厌恶所带来的更高的保险动机意味着更高的福利慷慨和更多宽松的就业要求,同时也缩短了受益期限。

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