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Disincentive effects of unemployment insurance benefits: maximum benefit duration versus benefit level

机译:失业保险金的抑制作用:最大保险金期限与保险金水平的比较

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This paper uses a unique dataset about unemployment benefit recipients and their exits to employment in Estonia to investigate the effects of benefits on unemployment duration. Both nonparametric and parametric estimations show that unemployment benefits have a strong and significant disincentive effect on hazard rates to exit into employment, just as search theory predicts. The effects of benefits are stronger and more homogeneous when the maximum duration of unemployment insurance benefit is longer. The unemployed eligible for shorter unemployment insurance benefits are influenced more by the size of benefits and changes in the benefit replacement rate. Also, both for the unemployed with shorter benefit periods and for the unemployed with longer benefit periods a rise in hazard rates occurs during the benefit period and a sharp drop straight after.
机译:本文使用关于失业救济金领取者及其在爱沙尼亚的就业退出的独特数据集来研究救济金对失业持续时间的影响。正如搜索理论所预测的那样,非参数估计和参数估计都表明,失业救济金对退出就业的危险率具有强烈而显着的抑制作用。当失业保险金的最长期限越长时,收益的效果越强,且同质性越高。有资格获得较短失业保险金的失业者受福利金规模和福利替代率变化的影响更大。同样,对于失业期较短的失业者和失业期较长的失业者,在失业期期间危险率均会上升,此后便急剧下降。

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