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Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: A within-subjects analysis

机译:顺序社会困境中的偏好和信念:受试者内部分析

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摘要

In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction channels. When subjects play both roles in such experiments, a positive correlation between first- and second-mover behavior is frequently reported. We find that the observed correlation primarily originates via an indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence beliefs through a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these beliefs. Specifically, beliefs about second-mover cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs. However, we also find evidence for a direct, preference-based channel. When first movers know the true probability of second-mover cooperation, subjects' own second moves still have predictive power regarding their first moves.
机译:在对游戏的实证分析中,偏好和信念通常被视为独立的。但是,如果信念和偏好相互影响,则可能会对观察到的行为的解释产生影响。我们的连续社会困境实验使我们能够分离出不同的互动渠道。当受试者在此类实验中同时扮演两个角色时,经常会报道先发和后发行为之间存在正相关。我们发现,观察到的相关性主要来自间接渠道,在该渠道中,先行者决策通过共识效应影响信念,而先行者决策是对这些信念的最佳反应。具体来说,对第二人合作的信念偏向于自己的第二人行为,并且大多数受试者对陈述的信念有最佳的反应。但是,我们也发现了直接,基于偏好的渠道的证据。当先行者知道了第二手合作的真正可能性时,受试者自己的第二步仍然对他们的第一步具有预测力。

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