Security in a nuclear weapons free world : how to cope with the nuclear, biological and chemical weapons threat

摘要

This study attempts to answer the question of how security in a nuclear weapons free worldcan best be achieved. In doing so, it analyzes the most severe security threats such a worldmight have to face and the responses that can be envisioned to counter these threats. Thestudy departs from the conventional approach in so far as it starts from the assumption thatthe difficult transition phase down to a level of zero nuclear weapons has been managedsuccessfully and that a NWFW already exists.However, it is not assumed in this study that a world free of nuclear weapons will be aworld free of risks or security threats. Quite to the contrary, a number of security threats areconceivable and have to be taken seriously. Those stemming from the acquisition ofweapons of mass destruction (WMD) will be investigated systematically. Security threatsemanating from a conventional military superiority are beyond the scope of this paper andwill not be dealt with.In addition, it is not intended to compare the security threats and benefits of a nuclearweapons free world with a world in which nuclear weapons still exist. However, acomparison of the two conceivable model nuclear weapons free worlds will be provided inorder to show the pitfalls of a world of so-called “virtual nuclear arsenals”.After an explanation of these two models of a NWFW, i.e. the complete elimination ofnuclear weapons and a world without assembled nuclear weapons, the security threatsemanating from NBC weapons cited most often in the debates on deep cuts in nucleararsenals or a nuclear weapons free world are discussed in some detail. These security threatsare1) a nuclear breakout bya) a cheating ex-NWS trying to renuclearize,b) an NNWS allied with a former NWS, orc) a “pariah state” going nuclear;2) the use or threat of use of biological and/or chemical weapons,Following the explication of these security threats, a set of possible responses will beassessed in terms of their applicability and usefulness to the model NWFW. The responsesanalyzed include consultation and clarification procedures and mechanisms, theestablishment of ballistic missile defense systems, ways of deterring a violation of a NWFWby conventional military means, smart sanctions and positive incentives, and, last but notleast, the provision of non-nuclear security guarantees.“Moving” in such a fictional world free of nuclear weapons obviously has to rest on a set ofassumptions which can be subdivided into two broad categories. The first concerns relationsbetween states in general terms and is not necessarily directly related to the goal of nucleardisarmament, but nevertheless forms a basic underpinning for the whole endeavour. Theimportance of these “world order tasks” should by no means be underestimated as aframework for achieving and maintaining a NWFW. The realization of one of the six tasks,however, stands out: the maintenance of stable relations among the major powers. Theseinclude not only the current NWS, but also states like Japan, Germany, and a few others.IIIIWhile further nuclear reductions are not the most important precondition here (economicand political factors will assume this function), without such stable, non-competitiverelations the goal of a NWFW hardly seems achievable.The second category of assumptions is directly related to a NWFW and includes, first andforemost, the verifiability of the absence of nuclear weapons. The verifiability of a NWFWwill - for the purposes of this study - be assumed not to cause insurmountable problems.Secondly, it is assumed that the BW- and CW-control regimes will have reached or are atleast close to achieving universal participation and that the BW and CW arsenals of themajor powers will have been destroyed. Additional characteristics of a NWFW will beoutlined in the section on what exactly constitutes up such a world.The study concludes that security in a NWFW is achievable and does not require theimplementation of an unrealistic new world order, featuring a world government or the like.The responses which can reasonably be expected to be available for countering the threatsemanating from “NBC desires” that a very limited number of identifiable states may stillharbor can be expected to be sufficient for the task.As the analysis shows, the motivations for a clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapons in aNWFW in general are low and can be expected to be strongest in pariah states which findthemselves in international isolation, feel threatened by their external environment and aregoverned by an idiosyncratic leadership. In former nuclear weapons states as well as in nonnuclearweapons states which enjoy stable and friendly external relations, the motivation toacquire WMD for security or prestige reasons or for the support of military action can beassumed to be at least close to, if not absolutely zero. Similarly, CBW use is most likely tobe contemplated by a regional aggressor facing a conventionally superior intervention force.These NBC threats might occur in a world in which the normative framework against thepossession and use of these categories of weapons will be much more developed than intoday´s world. The continuous fulfillment of the six “world order tasks” will provide aninternational environment conducive to the realization of these norms. In addition, thelimited number of states who qualify as suspects for NBC proliferation will be known andon the radar screen either of great powers, or of international organizations tasked toimplement the NBC conventions, or of both. This should make it possible to calibrate themix of responses to the individual perpetrator.However, none of the responses which are available in cases of both nuclear and CBWbreakout scenarios should be expected to do the job alone. A composite approach that canbe confined to the conventional level seems most promising in dealing with potentialproliferators.The first line of defense against any conceivable threat scenario will be formed byconsultation and clarification mechanisms and procedures, or more broadly, diplomacy.Although this may sound banal, it is not: opponents of drastic nuclear disarmament steps orthe complete elimination of nuclear weapons more often than not portray a NWFW as aworld in which one would inevitably be confronted with abundant threats to nationalsurvival, with hardly any time to react and certainly no time to engage in lengthy discussionsor diplomatic activities. It is by no means certain that this will have to be so. On thecontrary, the CWC already disposes of a set of useful provisions, and the protocol to theIIIBWC currently under negotiation can be expected to contain a similar set of provisions.Negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention will certainly not set lower standards thanthose established in the context of CBW. This means that the critical point might notnecessarily be the availability of consultation and clarification procedures, but rather theinability to come to decisions on how to proceed in case of evidence of a violation within areasonable time-frame, especially if the - long overdue - reform of the UN Security Councilcannot be achieved before a NWFW is established.Defense and protection against WMD will also have to play an important role in acomposite strategy for securing a NWFW. While missile defenses against WMD attack willclearly be limited in their impact on an aggressor´s ability to effectively disseminate eithernuclear weapons or CBW agents, passive defenses against the latter categories of weaponswill be essential in countering CBW threats in a NWFW. On the basis of the assumptionthat CBW use by a regional aggressor is the most likely scenario, one cannot assume thatconventional deterrence will always work. Consequently, it is imperative to limit thedamage in case deterrence fails. A limited number of casualties will make possible a limitedresponse, keeping potential destruction as low as possible. However, in case the war aim isset as high as the defeat, disarmament and reform of a regional aggressor, CB defenses willagain be instrumental in achieving this aim.Smart sanctions and positive incentive, provide another useful tool in addressing a WMDbreakout, short of actually waging a war to redress a situation. Sanctions and conditionalincentives can be adapted to a variety of violations and transgressions, singling out those ina non-compliant state who bear the responsibility while at least attempting to limit damageto the (presumably) larger part of the population not involved in the WMD relatedactivities. To the extent that the severity of the violation increases and conditional incentivesgive way to first smart and then all-out economic sanctions, the ability of the imposingstates to address those in charge either individually or as a group will increasingly be lost.Yet the ability to differentiate between a regime leadership and its population is also limitedin a war, especially when it comes to punishing counter-value or counter-population strikesby conventional military means.This leads to the role and functions of conventional deterrence in a NWFW. Although theabove discussion of conventional deterrence cannot be more than a first sketch of a muchmore thorough analysis to come, it already seems clear at this point that the old cold warinspired concept of conventional deterrence focusing on a massive Soviet attack on WesternEurope is largely outdated. It may retain some relevance in a regional context in which twoor more smaller states unite with the aim of deterring a conventionally superior regionalgreat power. On a more general level, however, dynamic deterrence postures will have to bedeveloped which are oriented towards the identifiable suspects and take into account theirbehavioral characteristics. These conventional deterrence postures will have to be updatedregularly so that they reflect evolving threat scenarios. The actual use of conventionalmilitary force after deterrence “has failed” will almost certainly represent one of the triggersfor such an update. Such an anticipated conventional retaliation might appear a veryunpleasant prospect to some. However, certain regions of the world might at times presentthemselves as rather unpleasant places - the occurrence of NBC proliferation in any countrywould certainly qualify for that characterization - requiring commensurate responses, one ofIVIVwhich would be the use of conventional military means to restore security and internationalpeace.All these measures provide an impressive array of policy tools which make it possible toaddress the threat to use or an actual attack involving WMD. We can therefore concludethat achieving security in a NWFW by conventional (military) means is not an “unconventionalmirage”, and we should make a NWFW in the true sense of the word thedeclared endstate of all disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and start laying out theroadmap showing us the way towards this goal. Although a number of proposals havealready been made for further disarmament steps on the path leading to zero nuclearweapons, the crucial question of which steps to take in which order needs as much furtherresearch as the question of how to integrate the disarmament process in a wider securityframework, so as to increase the security of states while the individual disarmament stepsare pursued.In addition to further reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, it will be absolutelyessential to focus on the establishment of an adequate institutional framework for a NWFW.Currently, both the normative environment and the organizational structures related todisarmament measures are insufficiently developed for a NWFW. Furthermore, securityguarantees have to be re-conceptualized so as to divest them of their nuclear connotations.