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RECIPIENT BEHAVIOUR IN SECURITY COOPERATION RELATIONSHIPS THE USE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE EXPANSION OF THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES, 1968-1990

机译:1968年至1990年,在安全合作关系中的接受者行为与在伊拉克武装力量的扩张中使用军事援助有关

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摘要

This thesis examines how Baathist decision-makers expanded the Iraqi armed forces through security cooperation between 1968 and 1990.Current literature on military assistance looks primarily at supplier perspectives. When recipients are discussed, they are often portrayed as "satellites" of their military suppliers, who manipulate them into following policies which are detrimental to their national security and economic interests. This thesis questions this theoretical approach by looking at the growth of Iraqi military power between 1968 and 1990. Despite having a diminutive military force at the start of this period, during the 1980s Iraq emerged as the second largest military importer in the world and was able to defeat an adversary three times its size, Iran. By 1990 Iraq possessed the fourth largest military in the world. Earlier studies of Iraq's unprecedented military expansion were conducted before access to Baathist decision-making was available. Consequently, previous accounts focused on supplier policies (Smolansky, 1991; Timmerman, 1992; Jentleson, 1994). Contrary to such accounts, this thesis argues that the expansion of the Iraqi armed forces was the direct result of Baathist policies.Analysing newly available primary sources, including hundreds of high-level Iraqi government files obtained after the 2003 Gulf War, this thesis reveals the Baathist strategy for acquiring military power through security cooperation. It shows why Iraqi leaders were motivated to expand the armed forces in the first place; how they minimised supplier influence, mitigated defence dependence through diversification and indigenous production, and sustained high-levels of economic growth; and how they used foreign assistance to improve Iraqi military effectiveness. By bringing new details to light on Baathist-era Iraqi military imports policies, this thesis challenges conventional thinking regarding supplier-recipient dynamics and calls for further research into the study of recipient-supplier relationships.
机译:本文研究了复兴党的决策者如何在1968年至1990年之间通过安全合作扩大伊拉克武装力量。当前有关军事援助的文献主要着眼于供应商的观点。在讨论接收者时,通常将它们描绘成军事供应商的“卫星”,他们操纵他们采取不利于国家安全和经济利益的政策。本文通过考察1968年至1990年伊拉克军事力量的增长来质疑这种理论方法。尽管在此期间初期军事力量有所减少,但在1980年代,伊拉克成为了世界上第二大军事进口国,并且能够击败三倍于伊朗的对手。到1990年,伊拉克已成为世界第四大军事力量。在获得复兴党的决策权之前,对伊拉克前所未有的军事扩张进行了较早的研究。因此,以前的论述主要集中在供应商政策上(Smolansky,1991; Timmerman,1992; Jentleson,1994)。与这种说法相反,本论文认为伊拉克武装力量的扩张是复兴党政策的直接结果。通过分析最新可用的主要资源,包括2003年海湾战争后获得的数百个伊拉克高层政府档案,本文揭示了伊拉克武装力量的发展。复兴党通过安全合作获得军事力量的战略。它说明了为什么伊拉克领导人首先有动力扩大武装力量;他们如何最大程度地减少供应商的影响,如何通过多样化和本土生产减轻对国防的依赖,以及持续的高水平经济增长;以及他们如何利用外国援助来提高伊拉克的军事效力。通过揭露复兴党时代的伊拉克军事进口政策的新细节,本论文挑战了有关供应商-接收者动态的传统思想,并呼吁对接收者与供应商之间的关系进行进一步研究。

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    Svet Oleg;

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