This thesis aims to compensate for the defects in the forms of conceptualism which JohnudMcDowell (1994a) and Bill Brewer (1999) hold: it does this by analysing the conceptualudstructure of the content of experience using colour experience as the central case.udFirst, the root of the debate between conceptualism and non-conceptualism, as I shalludargue, is the different notions of concept and experience used by the two sides. The nonconceptualists’udnotion of a concept, or conceptual capacity, has been defined veryudnarrowly, satisfying very restricted conditions, whereas their notion of experience isudmuch wider and more flexible, ranging from a subpersonal state to a personal level. Byudcontrast, conceptualists are quite open to broad notions of a concept, or conceptualudcapacity, but seem to define the content of experience as belonging only to the personaludlevel.udSecond, in order to build a bridge between these two different notions of both conceptudand experience respectively, I will argue that three major types of conceptual capacitiesudcan operate in experience. I call this ‘conceptual engagement’. I then suggest that weudneed to consider two perspectives on colour experience: namely, the functional and theudexpository. The former concerns ‘how experience physically works’, whereas the latterudconcerns “what experience has.” Both perspectives will prove useful for explainingudperceptual content at the sub-personal and personal level. This distinction is requiredudbecause what we call the ‘content’ of experience does not belong to just one particularudstage of experience.udLast, as a final supplementation of previous conceptualism, I will consider theuddiscrimination abilities involved in perception as being themselves a type of conceptualudcapacity. At this point, I will adopt the notion of receptivity as used by McDowellud(1994a), but deny that a conceptualist is committed to spontaneity being involved inudreceptivity. I will further propose that understanding discriminative abilities asudperceptual receptivity could prepare the ground for taking over perceptual contents intoudthe contents of thought. I will argue that perception could be passive and conceptual,udhence separate from spontaneity.
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