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Monetary and fiscal policy coordination and macroeconomic stabilization. A theoretical analysis.

机译:货币和财政政策协调以及宏观经济稳定。理论分析。

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摘要

We examine the relations between monetary and fiscal policies in the process of macroeconomic stabilization.Our model suggests that each policimaker prefers to be the second mover in a “Stakelberg” situation, i.e. where one policy makers precommits its policy choce. At the same time, both Stakelberg solutions are preferable, for each policumaker, to the Nash solution. We argue that there is a natural way to choose among two Stakelberg games. The solution implies that the government acts as a leader and sets fiscal policy according to the minimization of the Social Welfare Function (which fully internalizes also the objective of price stability). This optimal solution mirrors the existing institutional arrangements, where fiscal policy decisions ate typically taken before, and less frequently than monetary policy decisions.udWe interpret our results in relation to the debate on monetary-fiscal coordination in EMU and on the role of the Stability and Growth Pact. We argue that a coordination mechanism along the lines of the Broad Economic Policy is desirable.
机译:我们研究了宏观经济稳定过程中货币政策与财政政策之间的关系。我们的模型表明,每个决策者都倾向于在“ Stakelberg”情况下成为第二推动者,即一个决策者预先承诺其政策选择。同时,对于每个决策者而言,两种Stakelberg解决方案都比Nash解决方案更可取。我们认为在两种Stakelberg游戏中选择是一种自然的方法。解决方案意味着,政府应根据社会福利职能的最小化来发挥领导作用并制定财政政策(这也充分体现了价格稳定的目标)。这种最佳解决方案反映了现有的制度安排,在这种制度安排下,通常是在以前做出财政政策决定的,而没有货币政策决定那么频繁。 ud我们将我们的结果解释为与关于EMU中的货币-财政协调以及稳定作用的辩论有关和增长公约。我们认为,有必要根据广泛经济政策制定协调机制。

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