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'Sticky' Arbitration Clauses?: The Use of Arbitration Clauses after Concepcion and Amex

机译:'粘性'仲裁条款?:康塞和amex后的仲裁条款使用

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摘要

We present the results of the first empirical study of the extent to which businesses have switched to arbitration after ATu26T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion led commentators to predict that every business soon would use an arbitration clause, coupled with a class arbitration waiver, in their standard form contracts to avoid the risk of class actions. We examine two samples of franchise agreements: one sample in which we track changes in arbitration clauses since 1999, and a broader sample focusing on changes since 2011, immediately before Concepcion was decided. Our central finding is consistent across both samples of franchise agreements: the use of arbitration clauses in franchise agreements has increased since Concepcion, but not dramatically. Most franchisors have not switched to arbitration. Our results necessarily are limited to franchise agreements and may not be generalizable to consumer and employment contracts. But they are consistent with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau on changes in arbitration clause use in credit card and checking account agreements since Concepcion.We then consider why only a handful of franchisors have switched to arbitration clauses since Concepcion. Those predicting a switch to arbitration assume both that there is no reason for a business not to use an arbitral class waiver and that businesses readily and costlessly can and will modify their form contracts. In our view, both assumptions are subject to question. First, some businesses have good reasons not to use an arbitration clause. By using an arbitration clause, businesses contract for a bundle of dispute resolution services, including, for example, a very limited right to appeal. If a business perceives itself as unlikely to be subject to class action, these “bundling costs” may discourage the business from using an arbitration clause.. Second, standard form contracts, like negotiated contracts, might be resistant to change even if change might be in the business’s best interest--other words, standard form contracts might be “sticky.” We find empirical evidence to support both possible explanations. The Article concludes by considering how the Court’s subsequent decision in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant might affect the future use of arbitration clauses, as well as the use of class action waivers that are not part of an arbitration clause.
机译:我们提出到商家纷纷AT u26T移动有限责任公司诉后切换到仲裁。康塞普西翁程度的第一实证研究的结果。最高法院在康塞普西翁决定导致评论家预测,每个企业很快将使用的仲裁条款,再加上一类仲裁放弃,在他们的标准格式合同,以避免集体诉讼的风险。我们研究特许经营协议的两个样本:在我们从1999年开始跟踪仲裁条款的变化一个样本,和更广阔的样本集中在改变自2011年以来,翁决定之前。我们的核心发现是整个特许经营协议的两个样本是一致的:在特许经营协议中使用的仲裁条款的康塞普西翁以来有所增加,但不显着。大多数特许人还没有切换到仲裁。我们的研究结果不一定仅限于特许经营协议,也有可能推广到消费和就业合同。但它们与消费者金融保护局是一致的信用卡和仲裁条款利用变化的支票帐户协议自Concepcion.We再考虑为什么,因为只有康塞普西翁特许的少数已切换到仲裁条款。这些预测开关仲裁假设都没有理由对于一个企业不使用仲裁类放弃,企业容易和无成本能够而且将会改变他们的格式合同。在我们看来,这两种假设都受到质疑。首先,一些企业有很好的理由不使用的仲裁条款。通过使用仲裁条款,对争议解决服务,其中包括捆绑业务合同,例如,一个非常有限的上诉权。如果一个企业自认为是不太可能受到集体诉讼,这些“捆绑销售成本”可以使用的仲裁条款劝阻业务。二,标准格式合同,如合同谈判,可能会拒绝改变,即使改变可能是在商家的最大利益 - 换句话说,标准格式合同可能是“粘性”。我们发现经验证据支持这两种可能的解释。文章最后考虑如何法院在美国运通公司诉随后决定。意大利餐厅的颜色可能会影响今后的使用仲裁条款,以及使用集体诉讼豁免不属于仲裁条款的一部分。

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