Recent philosophers assess differently the extent to which affinity is to be found between the idealist metaphysics of G. W. Leibniz and George Berkeley. I argue that these figures’ idealisms are indeed strongly aligned. They espouse related accounts of the nature of mental substance and state. They similarly restrict the domain of causality. They each reject the Lockean primary/secondary quality dichotomy. Over against the criticism that idealisms cannot allow for a distinction to be made out between real and illusory perceptual experience, the two philosophers offer comparable solutions. Nevertheless, their ontologies are not identical, and are primarily to be distinguished in terms of their disparate characterisations of ultimate reality as being either immanent or transcendent to percipient subjects like us. This continuum of transcendentism and immanentism has further application as a conceptual tool both for tracing the rise of modern philosophy and for developing new metaphysical and epistemological accounts of the nature of the world and our relation to it.
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机译：近期的哲学家对G. W. Leibniz和George Berkeley的唯心主义形而上学之间发现亲和力的程度进行了不同的评估。我认为这些人物的理想主义确实是高度一致的。他们支持有关精神实质和状态本质的相关论述。它们同样限制了因果关系的范围。他们每个人都拒绝Lockean的主要/次要质量二分法。反对唯心主义不能区分真实的和虚幻的知觉经验的批评，两位哲学家提供了可比的解决方案。然而，它们的本体论并不完全相同，主要是要根据它们对最终现实的不同描述来区分，这些特征对于像我们这样的有远见的主体是内在的或超然的。超越主义和内在主义的连续体作为一种概念工具，在追查现代哲学的兴起以及对世界的本质及其与我们的关系的发展提出新的形而上学和认识论的解释时，都得到了进一步的应用。
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