Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Staff Study 173. ImprovingPublic Disclosure in Banking. Study Group on Disclosure Federal Reserve System

摘要

The use of market discipline as a complement to bank supervision and regulationhas gained greater acceptance in the United States and abroad. It is also widely recognized that effective market discipline depends on market participants' having information about the risks and financial condition of banking organizations. Therefore, attention is being focused increasingly on ways to improve transparency in banking. Section 1 of this report lays the foundation for the initiatives by considering how market discipline could supplement supervision. Section 2 reviews the empirical evidence on market oversight and discipline in banking. Section 3 examines the disclosure process itself. Section 4 discusses specific problem areas in disclosure at U.S. banking organizations, including four related to credit risk: risk retained in securitization, risk-rating categories, contributions to loan-loss reserves, and credit concentrations. The section also examines issues related to disclosures of market risk and disclosures by lines of business. Section 5 discusses several initiatives intended to promote better disclosure in banking.