Improving CIA Analytic Performance: DI Analytic Priorities. The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occasional Papers. Volume 1, Number 3.

摘要

A host of reports have been written over the 50 years of CIA history evaluating analytic performance and recommending changes in priorities and tradecraft. These 'post-mortem reports' have been issued by Agency leaders and components as well as by Congressional committees and commissions and non-governmental organizations concerned about intelligence performance. Starting with the 1990s, post-mortem reports increased in number, generated both by charges of specific intelligence failures and by general recognition that the post-Cold War period presented new challenges to intelligence. The recent post-mortem reports have helped Directorate of Intelligene leaders to examine current doctrine and practice critically, and to address identified challenges in training programs. This Occasional Paper is one of a series of assessments of what recent critiques have said about the key challenges facing the DI in the new century.